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Louisiana: Hot and Spicy!
Jonathan O. Knuckey, Christine L. Day, and Charles D. Hadley
At the beginning of the 2004 presidential election campaign, Louisiana
was considered a potential “battleground” state. While George W. Bush had
won the Bayou State in 2000, his victory margin of just under eight percentage points was modest, and the smallest margin of any of the five Deep
South states. Given that Bill Clinton had carried the state twice in the 1990s,
and, given a Democratic advantage in party identification, Democratic
strategists felt that the Kerry/Edwards ticket could at least make the BushCheney ticket spend time and valuable resources defending the state, but it
was not to be.
Political Context
Democratic optimism in Louisiana was motivated by the fact that the
party had won two closely contested statewide elections in the previous two
years. In 2002, Democratic incumbent U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu defeated
her Republican opponent Suzanne Haik Terrell, the Commissioner of Elections and former New Orleans City Councilwoman. Landrieu initially was
elected by the narrowest of margins in 1996 when she defeated archconservative Louis “Woody” Jenkins by a margin of just 5,788 votes (Hadley
and Knuckey 1997). In 2002, Landrieu received 46 percent of the vote in
Louisiana’s unique open primary system—where all candidates run against
each other regardless of party—compared to Terrell’s 27 percent. However,
the combined vote for the Republican candidates totaled 51 percent, suggesting that Terrell could win if she were able to unite the Republican vote.
Having regained control of the U.S. Senate in the 2002 midterm elections,
Republicans were eager to add to their narrow majority, and consequently
Republican leaders campaigned aggressively on behalf of Terrell, including
President Bush, former President George H. W. Bush, Vice President Dick
Cheney, former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, U.S. Senator Trent Lott of
Mississippi, and U.S. Senator-elect Elizabeth Dole of North Carolina (Welch
2002). The election was given further national prominence when Landrieu
and Terrell debated each other on NBC’s “Meet the Press.”
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Despite the efforts of Republicans to nationalize the election, Landrieu
was able to defeat Terrell. Although the runoff remained close, Landrieu’s
margin in 2002 was more comfortable than in 1996, 52 percent of the vote
compared to Terrell’s 48 percent. Perhaps working in Landrieu’s favor was
the fact that control of the U.S. Senate did not depend on the outcome, as
some pundits had predicted prior to the midterm elections. Thus, voters in
Louisiana could support Landrieu in the knowledge that they would not be
throwing the Senate to the Democrats. Indeed, Landrieu emphasized in the
runoff that she shared many of President Bush’s positions, although, unlike,
Terrell, she would not simply be there to “rubber-stamp” the president’s
agenda.
Two other factors proved decisive in Landrieu’s favor. First, she benefited from a strong get-out-the-vote effort among black voters by Congressional Black Caucus members who campaigned for her in New Orleans and
around the state, especially in black churches (Online NewsHour 2002; cf.
Sellers 2002). The mobilization of the Democratic base also was helped by
automated telephone messages from former President Bill Clinton.
Second, in the last week of the campaign Landrieu focused on the issue
of Mexican sugar imports and their impact on Louisiana sugar cane growers,
accusing Terrell of supporting the White House in a “secret deal” that would
double the flow of sugar coming from Mexico, a claim Terrell vigorously
denied. These charges may have helped Landrieu in the crucial Acadiana
region, the location of Louisiana’s sugar cane producers. Here Landrieu
received 52 percent of the vote, having lost the region with 48 percent six
years earlier. Furthermore, of the thirteen parishes (i.e., the top quintile)
where Landrieu’s vote increased the most compared to 1996, nine parishes
had a sizeable dependence on the sugar cane industry. (On the sugar issue,
see Naresh 2002; Hockstader and Hossiter 2002.)
The 2003 gubernatorial election was regarded as an important test of
statewide strength for both political parties, given that popular two-term
Republican Governor Murphy J. “Mike” Foster was constitutionally prohibited from seeking a third term. Republicans, keen for an unprecedented
third consecutive gubernatorial victory, united early behind Bobby Jindal, an
acknowledged rising star in the party. Jindal at the age of 32 had already
served in the Bush Administration as Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as well
as Louisiana’s Secretary of Health and Hospitals under Governor Foster.
Moreover, in a state where race has often loomed large in statewide elections, Jindal, whose parents were immigrants from India, presented a different face for the Republican Party. On the Democratic side no clear favorite emerged, following the decision earlier in the year of popular U.S. Senator John Breaux to not run for governor.1 Of the three serious Democratic
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contenders, Lieutenant-Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco was considered to have an edge over Attorney General Richard Ieyoub and former
member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Claude “Buddy” Leach.
In the Louisiana-style gubernatorial primary, Jindal finished first with
33 percent, the highest share of the vote for a candidate in the first round of
a gubernatorial election with no incumbent running since 1987. Blanco finished second to claim the runoff spot, but her 18 percent of the vote was the
lowest share of the vote a runoff candidate has received since 1971. Ieyoub
and Leech received 16 and 14 percent of the vote, respectively. The remainder of the vote was split between 13 other candidates, the largest share going
to State Senate President Randy Ewing, who received nine percent.
In the runoff election, the challenge for Jindal was to maintain his conservative support from the primary election while moderating his stance
enough to capture the support of Ieyoub and Leech voters. Blanco faced the
familiar challenge of a Democrat in a statewide race, the challenge of uniting
the fractured party vote behind her. Further illustrating the Democratic
divide was New Orleans Democratic Mayor Ray Nagin’s endorsement of
Republican Jindal. Until the last week of the campaign, polls showed Jindal
holding a consistent lead over Blanco; a poll released by the University of
New Orleans found Jindal leading Blanco 44 to 40 percent with 16 percent
“undecided” (Howell 2003).
In the final week of the campaign, however, Blanco unleashed a series
of blistering negative ads against Jindal, accusing him of cutting costs and
hurting patient care, particularly for the poor, when he was Secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. She also portrayed Jindal as
an extremist, contrasting his no-exceptions position on abortion (even with
the mother’s life at stake) with her own slightly more flexible pro-life position. Jindal never adequately responded to these charges, allowing Blanco to
close the gap on him going into the day of the election. With momentum
now behind her, Blanco was able to win with 52 percent of the vote compared to Jindal’s 48 percent, thus becoming the first woman governor in
Louisiana history and the only current Democratic governor of a Deep South
state. Despite the close margin of victory, Blanco secured a majority of the
vote in 52 of Louisiana’s 64 parishes, showing strength in many of the
sparsely populated rural counties. This suggests the possibility of racial voting against Jindal, especially in the northern part of the state which has been
fertile territory for racial protest candidates from Strom Thurmond in 1948
to George Wallace in 1968 (Howard 1972) and to David Duke in the early
1990s (see, for example, Rose 1992, Bridges 1994, and Howell 1994).2
In sum, Democratic candidates had won two highly visible recent statewide elections, giving the party some hope for the presidential race. At the
same time, the idiosyncratic factors that swayed the outcome of both elections surely dampened the Democrats’ confidence.
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General Election Results and Analysis
Presidential Election
As early as August, a month before the general election campaign had
officially started, most polls showed incumbent President George W. Bush
with a double-digit lead over U.S. Senator John Kerry, prompting the Democratic ticket to essentially pull out of the state by mid-September (AP 2004).
Thus, the question was not whether Bush would carry Louisiana’s nine Electoral College votes, but what would be the size of his victory margin over
Kerry.
Voter turnout in Louisiana, based on the voting-age population, was
58.5 percent, the highest turnout rate of any of the eleven southern states,
and slightly higher than the nationwide turnout rate of 56.2 percent. This
represented an increase over the 2000 presidential election turnout (55.2 percent), although it was less than that in 1992 (59.8 percent), which remains
the highest voter turnout rate for the state in the post-Voting Rights Act era.
Among registered voters, turnout was 66.5 percent, with whites having a
turnout rate of 70.4 percent and blacks 61.1 percent.3 Overall, the total vote
in Louisiana increased to just over 1.9 million in 2004 from 1.7 million in
2000. (See Knuckey and Hadley 2002 on the 2000 presidential election in
Louisiana.) Interestingly, this increase was almost entirely a result of the
increase of 174,298 in the Republican vote, compared to just a 27,955 increase in the Democratic vote. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of a
higher level of voter turnout in 2004 being beneficial to the Democrats, it
appears that a strong Republican mobilization effort helped the party’s
candidates in Louisiana just as it did nationally (Bumiller, Halbfinger and
Rosenbaum 2004; cf. Alpert 2004).
As the polls had indicated, Republican Bush easily carried Louisiana’s
nine Electoral College votes, defeating Democrat Kerry by 14.5 percentage
points, 56.7 to 42.2 (see Table 1). Bush’s margin of victory was almost
double that he enjoyed over Al Gore in the 2000 contest (7.7 percentage
points), and it was the largest Republican margin of victory in the state since
Ronald Reagan’s re-election victory in 1984 (22.6 percentage points). Indeed the only other Republican presidential candidate who achieved a larger
victory margin was Richard Nixon in 1972 (37.0 percentage points). Of
course, both Reagan and Nixon carried the state in election years that were
national landslides for the Republicans.
Geography
An analysis of the presidential vote by parish (county) reveals the geographic breadth of Bush’s victory. Bush carried a majority of the vote in
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Table 1. Results of the 2004 Louisiana
Presidential and Congressional Elections
Candidate (Party)

Percent of Vote

Vote Totals

President
George W. Bush / Dick Cheney (R)
John Kerry / John Edwards (D)
Ralph Nader / Peter Camejo (I)
Michael Peroutka / Charles Baldwin (C)
Michael Badnarik / Richard Campagna (L)
Walt Brown Brown / Mary Alice Herbert (S)
Amondson / Pletten (P)
David Cobb / Patricia LaMarche (G)
James E. Harris, Jr. / Maggie Trowe (SW)
Total Presidential Vote

56.7
42.2
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

1,102,169
820,299
7,032
5,203
2,781
1,785
1,566
1,276
985
1,943,096

U.S. Senate
David Vitter (R)
Chris John (D)
John Kennedy (D)
Arthur A. Morrell (D)
Richard M. Fontanesi (I)
R.A. “Skip” Galan (I)
Sam Houston Melton, Jr. (D)
Total Senate Vote

51.0
29.3
14.9
2.6
0.8
0.7
0.7

943,014
542,150
275,821
47,222
15,097
12,463
12,289
1,848,056

78.4
6.7
4.4
4.2
3.5
2.8

225,708
19,266
12,779
12,135
10,034
7,975
287,897

Second District (New Orleans)
William J. Jefferson (D)*
Arthur L. “Art” Schwertz (R)
Total District Vote

79.0
21.0

173,510
46,097
219,607

Third District (New Iberia-Houma)**
Charles Melancon (D)
W.J. “Billy” Tauzin, III (R)
Total District Vote

50.2
49.8

57,611
57,042
114,653

U.S. House of Representatives
First District (Greater New Orleans Suburbs)
Bobby Jindal (R)
Roy Armstrong (D)
M.V. “Vinny” Mendoza (D)
Daniel Zimmerman (D)
Jerry Watts (D)
Mike Rogers (R)
Total District Vote

Fourth District (Shreveport-Bossier City)
Jim McCrery (R)*

Unopposed
table continues . . .
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Table 1 (continued)
Candidate (Party)
U.S. House of Representatives (continued)
Fifth District (Monroe-Alexandria)
Rodney Alexander (R)*
Zelma “Tisa” Blakes (D)
John W. “Jock” Scott (R)
Total District Vote

Percent of Vote

Vote Totals

59.4
24.6
16.0

141,495
58,591
37,971
238,057

Sixth District (Baton Rouge)
Richard H. Baker (R)*
Rufus Holt Craig, Jr. (D)
Edward Anthony “Scott” Galmon
Total District Vote

72.2
19.4
8.4

189,106
50,732
22,031
261,869

Seventh District (Lake Charles-Lafayette)**
Charles Boustany, Jr. (R)
Willie Landry Mount (D)
Total District Vote

55.0
45.0

75,039
61,493
136,532

Key: * = incumbent; R = Republican Party; D = Democratic Party; I = Independent; C = Constitution Party; L = Libertarian Party; S = Socialist Party; P = Prohibition Party; G = Green Party; SW =
Socialist Workers Party; ** = Runoff election held December 4, 2004.
Note: Louisiana operates under an open electoral system in which all candidates run in a primary
election. If no candidate secures a majority of the vote in the primary election, the top two contenders, regardless of party, face each other in a runoff election. Runoffs were necessary for the Third
and Seventh Districts, and thus these are the results reported, rather than those for the primary
election.
Source: Compiled by the authors from election returns obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of
State Elections Division; see www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elections-index.htm.

54 of Louisiana’s 64 parishes, winning all of the parishes he had carried in
2000 plus four parishes won by Gore. The ten parishes carried by Kerry
were those with majority or near majority black populations, mostly the old
plantation parishes along the Mississippi River.
Overall, Bush built on the foundations of his 2000 victory in the state,
as evidenced by the near perfect parish-by-parish correlation of his 2000 and
2004 vote (r = .98). By dividing the state into four geographic regions
(Greater New Orleans, Acadiana, Florida Parishes, and North-Central), one
can discern areas of Republican strength and areas where Bush was most
successful in increasing his vote totals in the state (Table 2).4
Only in the Greater New Orleans area did Kerry lead Bush, albeit by
the narrowest of margins, 49.6 to 49.5 percent. However, this was due to
Kerry’s vote in overwhelmingly black and Democratic Orleans Parish (New
Orleans), where Kerry bested Bush 77.4 to 21.7 percent. Bush made up this
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Table 2. Louisiana 2004 Presidential Vote by Region (in percent)

Region
Greater New Orleans
Acadiana
Florida Parishes
North-Central
Total

Proportion of
State Vote

Bush

Kerry

% Change in
Republican Vote
2000-2004

27.3
30.9
15.8
25.9
100.0

49.5
58.2
58.9
61.2
56.7

49.6
40.5
40.1
37.7
42.2

+2.7
+5.1
+4.3
+4.5
+4.1

Note: See endnote 4 for a definition of the parishes than constitute each region.
Source: Computed by the authors from election returns obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of
State Elections Division; see www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elections-index.htm.

deficit in the suburban—and predominantly white—parishes of the Greater
New Orleans area by winning 66 percent of the vote compared to 33.2 for
Kerry. In the other three regions Bush won by landslide margins. The
Florida Parishes and the parishes in the North-Central part of the state have
become Republican strongholds, and in 2004 Bush won 58.9 and 61.2 percent, respectively. Interestingly Bush built on the breakthrough he had made
in 2000 in Acadiana, which consists of those parishes in the southern part of
the state with high proportions of French-Catholic Cajuns, a group that has
historically exhibited a tendency to be more Democratic than other white
voters in the state.5 Bush increased his vote in Acadiana to 58.2 percent in
2004 from 53.1 percent in 2000, suggesting an on-going realignment of
party preferences in “Cajun Country.” The causes of such realignment cannot be probed here, although cultural issues and the “values” divide appear
to be prime candidates in producing this pro-Republican shift in voting
preferences at the presidential level.6
Race, Gender, Age, and Income
Racial polarization characterized the vote choice in Louisiana as in
prior presidential elections (e.g., Knuckey and Hadley 2002; Hadley 1994)
and as in the rest of the South. According to exit polls (Table 3), Bush
received 75 percent of the white vote, while Kerry secured 90 percent of the
black vote. (Unless otherwise indicated, data on various demographic and
other voter groups are drawn from the exit poll data from the 2004 National
Election Pool, conducted by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International.) The rule of thumb in a statewide election in Louisiana is that a
Republican needs approximately two-thirds of the white vote, which Bush
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Table 3. Demographic and Political Factors
in the 2004 Presidential Vote (in percentages)
Voter Characteristic/Attitude

Bush

Kerry

Percent of Category

Race
White
Black

75
9

24
90

70
27

Gender
Men
Women

60
54

39
45

45
55

Gender (controlling for race)
White men
White women
Black men
Black women

77
74
14
13

23
25
83
87

33
38
12
17

Age
18-29
30-44
45-59
60+

53
56
53
66

45
42
47
34

20
30
27
20

Income
Under $15,000
$15-30,000
$30-50,000
$50-$75,000
$75-$100,000
Over $10,000

39
49
56
69
65
68

60
50
44
29
34
31

13
19
23
19
11
13

Party Identification
Democrat
Republican
Independent

21
95
58

78
5
39

42
40
18

Ideology
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

25
51
80

74
47
19

17
44
40

Bush Job Approval
Approve
Disapprove

92
8

8
91

58
41

Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Other
None

59
68
23
23

39
31
76
76

49
38
6
5
table continues . . .
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Table 3 (continued)
Voter Characteristic/Attitude

Bush

Kerry

Percent of Category

Religion and Frequency of Church Attendance
Protestant/weekly
73
Protestant/less often
63
Catholic/weekly
71
Catholic/less often
64
All others
40

25
37
29
34
60

14
10
19
17
35

White Evangelical/Born Again
Yes
No

85
47

15
52

27
73

Most Important Issue for Vote
Terrorism
Moral values
Economy/Jobs
War in Iraq
Taxes
Health care
Education

84
86
24
34
62
33
28

15
12
74
65
35
66
70

22
21
18
14
6
6
5

Most Important Candidate Quality
Strong leader
Will bring change
Clear stand on issues
Cares about people
Religious faith
Honest/trustworthy
Intelligent

86
5
73
37
94
78
36

14
94
23
63
5
21
64

20
20
15
14
10
10
5

Source: Edison/Mitofsky Exit Polls (Louisiana), November 2, 2004.

easily achieved. Likewise, Kerry fell far short of the one-third of the white
vote he would have needed to secure a victory. Indeed, the 24 percent of the
white vote that Kerry won was two percent lower than the white vote Al
Gore received in 2000, and the lowest share any Democratic presidential
nominee has received since Walter Mondale in 1984.7 In 2004, this meant
that the black vote again accounted for over half (58 percent) of the total
Democratic presidential vote. Likewise, the Republican vote in Louisiana
remains an overwhelmingly white vote, Bush having only increased his percentage among blacks by 3 percentage points.
As in the rest of a nation, a gender gap was evident in the presidential
vote, with Bush having a 21 percentage point lead among men, but just a
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nine point lead among women. However, this lead among women was
actually greater than in 2000, when Bush basically split the women’s vote
with Gore, 50 to 49 percent. When race is controlled for, the gender gap
virtually disappears, with both white men and white women giving landslide
levels of support to Bush, 77 and 74 percent respectively. White women are
often viewed as a group that might be more prone to an appeal by Democrats
in the South—at least when compared to white men. On the basis of the
2004 results, they remain well out of reach for any Democrat at the presidential level in Louisiana.
Although Bush carried every age group in Louisiana, there was a
noticeable difference between the youngest group (18-29), where Bush’s
margin over Kerry was eight percentage points, and the oldest group (60 and
over), where Bush’s margin was 32 percentage points. Interestingly, this
represents a reversal of the pattern in 2000, where the youngest age group
was Bush’s most supportive group, and the oldest group was his weakest.
Indeed, in 2000, the over-60 group was the only age group carried by Gore.
Bush’s support fell among the youngest cohort, but only by four percentage
points (Knuckey and Hadley 2002, 90-92).
A modest degree of social class-based voting was evident in Louisiana,
with Bush easily carrying those with a household income of at least $50,000,
and Kerry winning a large vote among those earning under $15,000. However, all income groups—except for those earning $30-50,000—registered
an increase in support for Bush compared to 2000. Indeed, the largest increases in support were among those with an income below $15,000 (up 13
percent) and those earning $15-30,000 (up 15 percent). This suggests issues
or political forces other than social class were at work in Louisiana in 2004.
Religion and Religiosity
One possible explanation for social class being less important to the
vote in 2004 than in 2000 was the increased salience of religion and religiosity. Bush received a majority of the vote among both Protestants and Catholics, but it was among the latter that he registered a large increase in his vote,
up 11 percentage points compared to 2000, while his vote among Protestants
remained the same. In contrast, Kerry won over three-quarters of the vote
among both respondents of other denominations and those with no religious
preference. This yielded little support for Kerry given that these groups
comprise only 11 percent of the total Louisiana electorate. It appears, however, that it was among religiously committed Protestants and Catholics—
those who attend church at least once a week—that Bush resonated most,
winning 73 and 71 percent of the vote respectively. Thus the CatholicProtestant cleavage that has often loomed large in the politics of Louisiana
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(e.g., Howard 1971, ch X) seems to have been replaced by a religiosity
cleavage, one that may reflect a more general cultural values divide evident
in the South and, indeed, the nation. Such a development may also help
explain the pro-Republican movement noted above in the heavily CajunCatholic parishes of the Acadiana region.
A further point to note about the effects of religion in 2004 is that those
respondents who identified themselves as white evangelicals or “born-again”
Christians constituted the base of the Republican vote. Indeed, this group
now exhibits levels of Republican loyalty in their voting behavior that rivals
that found among blacks toward the Democrats. Based on the size and
cohesiveness of the white evangelical vote, approximately 40 percent of
Bush’s statewide total came from this group although it comprises only
27 percent of the state population.
Party Identification and Ideology
As in 2000, the 2004 presidential election produced a “loyalty gap”
with Bush winning 95 percent of Republican identifiers, compared to
Kerry’s 78 percent among self-identified Democrats. Indeed, the 21 percent
of the vote Bush secured from Democrats was the largest Bush received in
any of the eleven southern states. Perhaps most interesting was the fact that
Democrats in Louisiana now have a party identification advantage of just
two percentage points over Republicans. Although Louisiana was one of
only two southern states—the other being Arkansas—where there was any
Democratic advantage, this two-percentage point lead compares to a 14point advantage in 2000. While this finding has less effect on presidential
elections (given the ability of Republican candidates to cut into the Democratic base and sweep independents), it has enormous consequences for party
competition below the presidential level (see below) where Democrats
traditionally relied on a partisan advantage over Republicans.
The voting behavior of respondents based on ideology also reflects the
fact that both candidates appealed to the electoral bases of their respective
parties, with Bush winning 80 percent of the vote among conservatives and
Kerry 74 percent of the voter among liberals. Of course, as conservatives
vastly outnumber liberals in Louisiana, such an ideologically polarized vote
benefited Bush. As in 2000 (e.g., Black and Black 2002, ch. 8), Bush also
won a majority of the vote among moderates. This is a crucial swing group
in Louisiana, as it is throughout the South. In 2004, moderates remained
virtually unchanged in the support they gave to both candidates compared
to support received by Bush and Gore in 2000 (52 and 46 percent, respectively).
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Short-term Political Factors
In terms of important short-term factors influencing the presidential
vote in Louisiana, Bush clearly had an advantage on both the issues and candidate qualities. Terrorism and moral values were cited as the most important issues in Louisiana, issues where Bush had an overwhelming advantage
over Kerry. While Kerry had a solid lead over Bush among those respondents who cited domestic policy issues, i.e., the economy, health care, and
education, as the most important reason for their vote choice, only 30 percent of the electorate said that these traditional Democratic issues were the
most important issues in 2004.
Bush also benefited from positive retrospective evaluations of his first
term, with 58 percent of respondents approving of his job performance;
Bush won 92 percent of their vote. Voters in Louisiana may have made prospective evaluative judgments between Bush and Kerry, with Bush favored
over Kerry as the candidate most trusted to handle the economy (56 to 39
percent) and terrorism (59 to 35 percent). Again, those who said they trusted
Bush more than they did Kerry voted overwhelmingly for Bush.
Lastly, Bush had an edge over Kerry on candidate qualities, with leads
among those respondents who cited “strong leadership,” “taking a clear
stand on issues,” “religious faith,” and “honesty” as the most important
qualities. Collectively, 55 percent of respondents cited these qualities as
most important. Kerry led Bush as the candidate that would bring change,
cared about people and who was viewed as intelligent, but only 39 percent
of the respondents cited these qualities as being most important.
U.S. Senate Election
The central concern in the U.S. Senate election was whether Republican David Vitter would be forced into a runoff election against a Democrat,
most likely U.S. Representative Chris John. Most observers did not believe
that Vitter would be able to secure a majority of the vote in the primary and
would then likely face a strong challenge in a runoff where a moderate candidate like John could brand Vitter as an ideologically extreme conservative.
This had been the formula that Democrats had employed in most statewide
contests in Louisiana over the past two decades (Lamis 1990, ch. 8; Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999). In 2004, this strategy did not work, and
Vitter became Louisiana’s first Republican U.S. Senator since the Reconstruction era, taking 51 percent of vote with John trailing far behind on 29.3
percent.
Perhaps Vitter’s biggest asset was the coattail of President Bush, but he
also had built a statewide grassroots organization, “a great grass-roots net-
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work with local Louisiana folks in every parish” said Vitter. In fact, “The list
of people . . . paid to coordinate volunteers [took] up dozens of pages of his
760-plus page campaign finance report” (Alpert 2004). A parish-by-parish
analysis of the presidential and Senate elections shows a high correlation
between the Bush/Vitter vote (r = .86). At the same time, Table 4 shows the
breakdown of the Senate vote by region and demonstrates a similar structure
to the pattern of support exhibited in the presidential contest.
Vitter was able to emerge from the Greater New Orleans area with a
majority of the vote, sweeping the suburban parishes around New Orleans
that constituted much of his congressional district, which offset his vote
deficit in the city of New Orleans. Like Bush, Vitter also swept the traditional Republican regions of the Florida and North-Central parishes. Perhaps
the biggest surprise was his ability to win a plurality (47.1 percent) of the
vote in the Acadiana region. This was surprising, given that southwestern
part of Acadiana was the location of John’s congressional district. Indeed, in
the parishes that constituted John’s Seventh district, Vitter narrowly outpolled John, 45.4 to 45.1 percent. Even assuming that the entire vote from
the third place candidate John Kennedy had gone to John, this still would
have left the Democrat winning a bare majority of 51.0 percent on his home
turf. Again, the success of Bush in securing a landslide vote in Acadiana, an
organization of paid grassroots organizers, and the willingness of voters to
cast a straight-ticket party vote, appears to have help Vitter and hurt the
Democrats’ prospects of forcing a runoff election in the U.S. Senate race.
Exit poll data provide further support for a presidential coattails effect
favoring Vitter in the Senate. For example, Vitter was able to secure most of
the Republican base, winning 88 percent of the vote from self-identified
Republicans, as well as 53 percent of the votes from independents, and
Table 4. Louisiana 2004 U. S. Senate Vote by Region (in percent)
Region
Greater New Orleans
Acadiana
Florida Parishes
North-Central
Total

Proportion of
State Vote

Vitter

John

Kennedy

27.6
31.0
16.1
25.3

50.1
47.1
54.4
54.7

25.1
37.8
25.5
26.0

17.9
11.3
16.1
15.4

100.0

51.0

29.3

14.3

Note: See endnote 4 for a definition of the parishes than constitute each region. Row percentages do
not add up to 100 because data for minor candidates are excluded.
Source: Computed by the authors from election returns obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of
State Elections Division; see www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elections-index.htm.
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even 16 percent of the vote from Democratic identifiers. The prospects of
party-line voting in statewide elections in Louisiana must be troublesome for
the Democrats, especially given that the party’s advantage in party
identification has now disappeared.
Vitter also benefited from his party’s unified support (Walsh 2004,
A-26). Although both major parties in Louisiana are factionalized, Vitter
was the only serious Republican to enter the Senate race, and even former
Governor Foster endorsed him. The Democrats, in contrast, divided their
support among three viable candidates, all of whom attacked each other
during the primary, wounding each other’s chances of forcing Vitter into a
runoff.
U.S. House of Representatives Elections
Sparks flew in the 2004 U.S. House of Representatives elections in
Louisiana, with open-seat elections in three of the seven districts, a partyswitching incumbent in yet another, and mud-slinging all around. When the
dust had settled, the Republican advantage in House seats had gone from 4-3
to 5-2, as each party lost one seat and gained another while one incumbent
switched from the Democrats to the Republicans.
Incumbents under Louisiana’s open elections system tend to enjoy
opposition-free reelection campaigns because there are no separate opposition-party primaries. Thus, most of the state U.S. House delegation—
William Jefferson in District 2, Jim McCrery in District 4, Richard Baker in
District 6, and even the party-switching Rodney Alexander in District 5—
faced no more than token opposition. Alexander’s switch to the Republican
Party was highly controversial initially. He had registered to run as a Democrat in August and then, two days later and only one half hour before the end
of the official qualifying period, Alexander withdrew and re-registered as a
Republican. The maneuver drew heated criticism from Republican opponent
John “Jock” Scott, who saw his official Republican party endorsement disappear as soon as the party had an incumbent to support; it drew equally
heated criticism from Democratic opponent Zelma “Tisa” Blakes, who
hoped to win over the district’s Democratic voters with the help of highprofile endorsements from Maya Angelou and civil rights activist Joseph
Lowery. Democratic contributors to Alexander’s campaign also were hopping mad after his last-minute party swap. In the end, however, voters in the
Fifth District, “rural and Protestant . . . part of the Bible Belt [and] ardently
pro-guns, anti-abortion and against gay marriage” gave Alexander 59 percent of their votes in the first primary, to Blakes’s 25 percent and Scott’s
16 percent (Ballard 2004).
Open-seat elections in Louisiana, as elsewhere, are generally candidate
free-for-alls as congressional hopefuls scramble to replace the departing
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incumbents. True to form, two of the open-seat races, those in Districts 3
and 7, were vigorously contested and descended into mud-slinging brawls as
candidates smeared each other with simplistic and personal attacks. District 1, on the other hand, was different. The conservative suburban New
Orleans district had been Republican David Vitter’s before he ran for the
Senate. Safely Republican, it provided an attractive opportunity for wellknown conservative politicians such as State Representative Steve Scalise.
But when Bobby Jindal, the loser in the previous year’s gubernatorial runoff,
moved from Baton Rouge into the district and subsequently jumped into the
race, he scared off virtually all of the seriously viable opposition. Parlaying
his high name recognition, high-level government experience, and conservative credentials into district-wide support—and this time not having to face
rural voters reluctant to vote for a non-white—Jindal defeated an ill-funded
and little-known field of five by winning 78 percent of the vote in the first
primary held simultaneously with the presidential general election.
The contests in Districts 3 and 7 produced no outright winner in the
first primary, and thus both went into early December runoff elections.
Louisiana is the only U.S. state with an open election in November followed
by possible runoff elections in December; every other state is finished by
early November. Therefore, the eyes of Congress-watchers nationwide were
on Louisiana as the last two congressional elections in the nation would
determine the size of the House Republican majority. What they saw was a
flurry of attack ads, personal smears, partisan bickering, and intra-party
infighting (e.g., Brown 2004a; cf. Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991; Lau,
Sigelman, Heldman, and Babbit 1999; and Lau and Pomper 2002). Combining the total party vote from the primary election suggested a Republican
advantage in District 3, where Republican candidates received 59 percent of
the primary vote. On the other hand, it was the Democrats with an edge in
District 7, where the combined party vote was 52 percent. It should be noted,
however, that George W. Bush received a landslide vote in both districts in
the presidential election, 58 percent in District 3 and 60 percent in District 7.
Neither race, in fairness, was devoid of serious policy discussion over
national and local issues. Candidates debated proposals on issues ranging
from tax policy and job growth to international trade and the steady erosion
of Louisiana’s coastline and fragile wetlands. Further, as the runoff campaigns descended into lowbrow negativity, it was not just local politicians
and consultants who spewed dirt. Both national parties created advertisements that added to the smear-fest. Local politicians and national party officials alike had understood the lesson from the previous year’s gubernatorial
campaign: negative advertising wins elections (Courreges 2004a, 2004b, and
2004c; Brown 2004b; Maginnis 2004).
In District 7, Chris John’s former district encompassing most of
Acadiana, the primary was marred by Democratic infighting, as candidate
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Don Cravins, an African-American State Senator, railed against state and
national party officials for backing State Senator Willie Mount, and refused
to endorse her in the runoff. The runoff campaign between Mount and her
Republican rival, retired heart surgeon Charles Boustany, Jr., featured attack
ads galore. Boustany’s campaign characterized Mount as a tax-loving antibusiness friend of John Kerry, one who wanted to make it easier to get the
“morning-after” contraceptive pill; Mount’s campaign portrayed Boustany
as an inexperienced, over-privileged aristocrat who disdained the charity
health system and who once aspired, unsuccessfully, to British royalty. Partisan and personal differences notwithstanding, both candidates held similar
positions on most of the issues, and the campaign ended amicably when
Boustany captured 55 percent of the vote to become the district’s first
elected Republican U.S. Representative (Courreges 2004c; Courreges and
Simoneaux 2004).8
The campaign in District 3, running along Louisiana’s southeastern
coast and encompassing parts of suburban New Orleans, also began with
intra-party scuffles plaguing both parties. Rising from the fray to make the
runoff were Republican Billy Tauzin III, enjoying instant name recognition
by virtue of the district’s popular retiring U.S. Representative Billy Tauzin,
Jr., and Democrat Charlie Melancon, a former president of the American
Sugar Cane League. Attack ads during the runoff campaign depicted Melancon as a man ready to raise taxes and fees while promoting third-grade sex
education, and Tauzin as an immature and inexperienced scofflaw hoping to
capitalize on his daddy’s fame. Melancon captured the district for the Democrats by a razor-thin margin of some 500 votes. Sugar, as in Mary Landrieu’s
2002 Senate victory, may have tilted the scales toward Melancon, the sugar
cane executive who pledged to block international trade agreements that
might threaten Louisiana sugar farmers’ livelihood. (See Courreges 2004b,
2004c; Nichols 2005; Brown 2004c; Brown 2004d.)
Conclusion: A Republican Future?
The 2004 elections in Louisiana must be considered one of the best in
the state’s history for the Republican Party. At the presidential level, a state
that some observers speculated could be in play in the general election produced a landslide victory for President George W. Bush. Regardless of the
candidates nominated by both parties in 2008, Louisiana should be considered a safe state for the GOP, especially now that the Acadiana region,
the one region of state that offered some hope for the Democrats in winning
white support, appears to have moved decisively in a pro-Republican direction. At the same time, the congressional elections produced an historic U.S.
Senate victory for the Republicans, with David Vitter becoming the first
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Republican senator from the state since the Reconstruction era. That Vitter
was able to accomplish this without being forced into a runoff election
should be worrying for Louisiana Democrats. In competition for U.S. House
seats, Republicans now hold a 5-2 majority. Perhaps the only welcome
news, and hardly enough to offset the presidential and Senate results, was
the fact that the Democrats won two congressional districts. However, given
that their newly won district voted heavily for Bush in 2004, the Democratic
incumbent Charlie Melancon may face a strong Republican challenge in
2006. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Melancon may follow the
example of other conservative Democrats in the state and switch parties.
The next major statewide elections are not until 2007, when Governor
Kathleen Blanco faces re-election. While Blanco now possesses an incumbency advantage, a unified Republican party could still mount a formidable
challenge if voters engage in the same type of party-line voting that characterized the 2004 elections. Republicans may also begin to make advances
in the state legislature. Currently, Democrats hold a solid majority of seats
in both the State House of Representatives (65 percent) and State Senate
(67 percent). However, Republican advances here and in other elections at
the state and local level appear likely if voters continue to engage in partisan
voting. Still, Louisiana’s free-for-all open elections system, the large supply
of moderate to conservative Democrats ready to support guns and oppose
abortion and gay marriage, and local issues from sugar to coastal erosion to
Saints football may all conspire to keep the state competitive in the foreseeable future.
NOTES
1

While Breaux, had he run, would undoubtedly have been the odds-on favorite to
have won, his decision not to maybe was influenced by considerations concerning the
tight balance of power in the U.S. Senate. Breaux would have had to give up his Senate
seat to run for governor, meaning that Republican Governor Mike Foster could appoint a
Republican as a replacement.
2
A correlation analysis of the parish-by-parish vote certainly suggests a different
structure to her vote as compared to that for other statewide Democratic candidates. For
example, the correlation coefficient between Blanco’s vote and that for U.S. Senator
Mary Landrieu in the 2002 Senate race and Al Gore in the 2000 presidential race were
fairly modest, r = .60 and .49, respectively. For a thorough discussion of possible racial
backlash voting against Jindal, see Skinner and Klinkner 2004.
3
Turnout rates that are based on the voting age population were taken from
www.uselectionatlas.org. Turnout data based on voter registration were taken from the
Louisiana Secretary of State Elections Division, “Voting Registration and Statistics”
www.sec.state.la.us/elections/elect-votereg-stats.htm#votestats.
4
Regions were defined as follows: Greater New Orleans includes Jefferson,
Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany Parishes. Acadiana includes
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Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cameron, Evangeline, Iberville,
Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Pointe Coupee, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the
Baptist, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, Vermilion, and West Baton Rouge
Parishes. Florida Parishes include East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Livingston,
St. Helena, Tangipahoa, Washington, and West Feliciana. North-Central includes Allen,
Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, De
Soto, East Carroll, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, La Salle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse,
Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, Tensas, Union, Vernon,
Webster, West Carroll, and Winn Parishes.
5
On the previously strong Democratic loyalties of white voters in Acadiana, see
Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw (1994, 303). On the importance of abortion and other
cultural issues to Republican support in Acadiana, see Parent 2004, 53.
6
See “How Louisiana Voted” 2004 for the parish by parish presidential vote.
7
The estimate of Mondale’s white vote is taken from Black and Black (1992, 335).
Based on this analysis, George McGovern was the only other Democratic presidential
nominee to receive a lower share of the white vote in Louisiana, winning an estimated
15 percent in 1972.
8
The Republicans had held District 7 for two years when Democrat Jimmy Hayes
switched parties following the 1994 midterm elections. Hayes gave up the seat for an
unsuccessful U.S. Senate bid in 1996, and it was recaptured for the Democrats by Chris
John.
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